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Kucana v. Holder
Docket No. 08-911
Argument Date: November 10, 2009
From: The Seventh Circuit
by Jessica E. Slavin
Marquette University Law School
CASE AT A GLANCE 
The dramatic amendments to U.S. immigration law in 1996 included various provisions limiting judicial 
review of the decisions of immigration agencies and officials. One of the broadest such limitations bars 
review of any decision “the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion 
of the Attorney General.” Nine years after first being ordered deported, the petitioner, Agron Kucana, filed 
a motion to reopen his immigration proceedings on the grounds that changed country conditions now 
justified his claim for asylum. 
I M M I G R AT I O N
Did Congress Strip the Federal Circuit Courts of the Power to Review Denials  
of Motions to Reopen Immigration Proceedings?
ISSUE
Does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bar judicial review of an immigra-
tion judge’s denial of a motion to reopen immigration proceedings?
FACTS
This case concerns Agron Kucana’s appeal from the denial of his 
second motion to reopen his asylum proceedings. The Seventh Circuit 
held, contrary to the arguments of both the United States and Mr. 
Kucana, that it was barred from reviewing the motion to reopen. On 
appeal, both parties argue that the statutory bar that the Seventh 
Circuit relied upon, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), does not apply to 
denials of motions to reopen, because nothing in the immigration 
statutes “specifie[s]” such motions to be “in the discretion of the 
Attorney General,” as required by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
Petitioner’s Initial Immigration Proceedings and  
First Motion to Reopen
The petitioner, Agron Kucana, is an Albanian citizen who came to the 
United States in July 1995 on a visitor’s visa, which authorized him 
to remain in the United States for 90 days. He overstayed his visa, 
and in May 1996 filed an application for asylum and withholding of 
removal, on the grounds that he had fled severe past persecution and 
had a well-founded fear of future persecution in Albania due to his 
active involvement in the Albanian Democratic Party and the sharp 
divisions that developed in that party after it took power in 1992. In 
his application, Kucana claimed that after a long series of threats, ar-
rests, and beatings, he finally fled when he received a warrant for his 
arrest on charges of “agitating against the party.” His final hearing in 
the asylum case was scheduled for October 9, 2007.
Kucana failed to appear at his hearing, apparently because he slept 
through his alarm. His failure to appear meant that consistent with 
8 U.S.C. § 1229a, the Immigration Judge issued an in absentia order 
for Kucana’s removal from the United States. Kucana filed a motion to 
reopen the proceedings, explaining that he had overslept and arrived 
at the immigration court soon after the in absentia order was issued. 
The Immigration Judge denied that motion because it did not satisfy 
the specific admonition of § 1229a(5)(C)(i) that such an order may 
only be rescinded based on a showing of “exceptional circumstances,” 
i.e., circumstances such as battery, serious illness or death, or other 
compelling circumstances beyond the alien’s control. The judge’s 
decision that Mr. Kucana could not prove “exceptional circumstances” 
justifying a motion to reopen was affirmed by the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals in May 2002.
Enactment of Immigration Reform Limiting Judicial Review
In September 1996, while Kucana’s asylum application was pend-
ing, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA), which provides in part that: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or non-
statutory), … and regardless of whether the … decision … is 
made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction 
to review … any decision … of the Attorney General … the au-
thority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the 
discretion of the Attorney General … , other than the granting 
of relief under section 1158(a) [i.e., asylum].
In that same immigration reform legislation package, Congress  
codified a numerical limitation on motions to reopen that the  
Department of Justice (DOJ) had recently adopted by regulation.  
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In the earlier, less sweeping immigration reform of 1990, Congress 
had directed the DOJ to enact a regulation limiting motions to 
reopen, and in April 1996, DOJ issued final regulations limiting liti-
gants to a single motion to reopen, filed within 90 days after the final 
administrative decision. The regulation specifies limited exceptions 
to the numerical limitation on motions to reopen, including motions 
to reopen “[t]o apply or reapply for asylum … based on changed 
circumstances.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) and (3)(ii).
In IIRAIRA, Congress enacted a similar (but not identical) statutory 
limitation on motions to reopen, providing that “an alien may file one 
motion to reopen proceedings under this section, except that this 
limitation shall not apply so as to prevent the filing of one motion 
to reopen described in subparagraph (C)(iv).” § 1229a(7)(A). The 
specified exception is for motions related to certain forms of relief for 
victims of domestic violence. § 1229a(7)(C)(iv).
Petitioner’s Second Motion to Reopen and Appeal  
to the Seventh Circuit
Kucana filed his second motion to reopen, in June 2006, on grounds 
of new evidence and changed country conditions supporting his  
claim for asylum, and on the fact that he was now awaiting another 
form of immigration relief, as a beneficiary of his mother’s “immedi-
ate relative” petition on his behalf. The motion was supported by a 
scholar of Balkan history and modern Albanian politics, who swore 
that “Agron Kucana has a reasonable and objective basis to fear 
future prosecution.” 
This second motion was denied and then appealed to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed denial of the motion on 
two grounds: first, that a second motion to reopen must be filed with 
the Board (the last decision-maker in the case), and second, that 
Kucana could not establish that he was now eligible for asylum “based 
on material changes that have occurred in Albania since his failure 
to appear,” as required to justify a second motion to reopen under 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
Kucana appealed to the Seventh Circuit. After the parties briefed  
and argued, the Seventh Circuit ordered them to submit an  
additional memoranda regarding a jurisdictional issue: whether  
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars review of a motion to reopen because the 
regulations specify that the board has discretion to deny motions to 
reopen. Both the government and Kucana argued that the provision 
could not apply to bar review of BIA decisions not to reopen because 
the BIA’s discretion is specified, not “under this subchapter,” i.e., the 
statutory subchapter, but only by regulation. 
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit, in reliance on a prior case holding 
that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) barred review of decisions made discretion-
ary by regulation, held that the section likewise barred its review 
of motions to reopen. As the dissenting Judge Cudahy noted, this 
decision set the Seventh Circuit at odds with all other circuit courts 
to have considered the issue. The Supreme Court thereafter accepted 
Kucana’s petition for review.
CASE ANALYSIS
Despite its complicated procedural history, the main issue in the 
case appears to be a relatively straightforward exercise of statutory 
interpretation. As both Kucana and the solicitor general point out, the 
actual words of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) stripped the courts of authority to 
review decisions “the authority for which is specified under this sub-
chapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.” They, along 
with numerous amici, argue that these words unambiguously limit 
the jurisdiction-stripping effect of this provision to decisions that are 
defined by statute to as within the attorney general’s discretion. No 
one in the case disputes that it is regulations promulgated under the 
statute, and not the statute itself, that specifies the BIA’s discretion 
with regard to motions to reopen.
Kucana argues, furthermore, that even if there were any ambigu-
ity, three “principles of statutory construction” strongly favor the 
interpretation of the majority of the circuits. He also points out that 
under the Seventh Circuit’s rule, there would be no check on agency-
level reviews of claims of changed country conditions. Perhaps worse, 
the decision seems to mean that the executive branch would have the 
power to decide which of its decisions should be subject to judicial 
review by specifying which are in its discretion.
The solicitor general’s brief reviews the statutory context, which in-
cludes a provision that appeals from denials of motions to reopen may 
be consolidated with appeals challenging the underlying final order, 
suggesting that Congress foresaw review of motions to reopen. The 
government also reviews the legal history of motions to reopen in im-
migration court, emphasizing that the motion was a judicial creation 
that had only months earlier been put into regulation, when Congress 
first enacted provisions relating to motions to reopen in 1996. “The 
federal courts long have reviewed denials of motions to reopen, and 
Congress did not indicate any intention to change that practice,” the 
solicitor general argues.
The brief of the court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the 
judgment essentially argues that the legislative history and purpose 
behind IIRAIRA and, specifically, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), show that Con-
gress wanted to enact a sweeping bar, and that the history of motions 
to reopen in immigration court confirms that Congress must have 
meant this bar to extend to motions to reopen. The brief recounts the 
history of the judicial development of motions to reopen, congres-
sional frustration with delay perceived to follow from the availability 
of those motions, the Congress-directed promulgation of regulations 
limiting the availability of those motions, and the ultimate enactment 
of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). “All told,” the amicus argues, “reading ‘under 
this subchapter’ to include decisions and actions made discretionary 
by a regulation promulgated under the subchapter is not only ‘most in 
accord with context and ordinary usage, …” but also “most compat-
ible with the surrounding body of law. … ” 
SIGNIFICANCE
The case has great significance. Removing all judicial review from 
denials of motions to reopen would obviously insulate a large number 
of immigration decisions from any judicial review. Such a situation 
appears troublesome in view of widely perceived weaknesses in the 
quality of decision making at the administrative level, some of which 
are addressed in the amicus brief of the National Immigrant Justice 
Center and other immigration advocates. 
Furthermore, motions to reopen are just one of many types of deci-
sions that immigration regulations place in the discretion of the 
“Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security,” (i.e., virtu-
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ally all immigration-related agencies and officials). If the Seventh 
Circuit’s interpretation were applied broadly, then a wide swath of 
decisions that have been subject to judicial review will be left to the 
absolute discretion of the administrative decision makers. The ACLU, 
for these reasons, urges the Court to limit its consideration to the 
particular question before it, whether judicial review of motions to 
reopen is barred, and to leave for another day questions of whether 
review of other decisions and actions is barred, as the lower courts 
continue to consider and develop law concerning those questions. 
The argument of the amici supporting the judgment, the Washington 
Legal Foundation and Allied Educational Foundation, attempts to 
shift the focus to an entirely new basis for denying review, arguing 
that Kucana’s second motion to reopen was barred in the first place, 
because Congress did not expressly incorporate the “changed circum-
stances” exception to the numerical limitation on motions to reopen. 
These amici argue that “[i]n light of the timing … the legislation 
can only be viewed as an explicit rejection of the Department of 
Justice rule permitting waiver of the one-motion-to-reopen rule with 
respect to claims for asylum and withholding of removal.” 
In addition to being at odds with U.S. treaty obligations not to return 
refugees to persecution, such an interpretation seems to raise seri-
ous constitutional questions that have in recent years led the Court 
to favor interpretations of IIRAIRA that preserve judicial review. See 
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 
678 (2001). In fact, in response to such concerns, Congress passed a 
post-IIRAIRA amendment that provides that nothing in that legisla-
tion “which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as 
precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised 
upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals 
in accordance with this section,” § 1252(a)(2)(D). Because Kucana 
challenged the decision below only as an abuse of discretion, this 
case does not seem to provide an opportunity to apply that provision.
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